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Introduction
THE UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE OF CROSS-
BORDER FINANCE
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ*
On behalf of the Duke University Global Capital Markets Cen-
ter, which is co-sponsoring this symposium, I am pleased to welcome
readers to the symposium issue.  The focus, of course, is on securiti-
zation, an increasingly important area of cross-border, or interna-
tional, finance.  Both cross-border finance and securitization can be
daunting to the uninitiated.  Cross-border finance involves multiple
legal systems with strange terms and sometimes even stranger rules.
Even if one could master the complexities of a foreign legal system,
one’s mastery would inevitably be short-lived, for laws keep chang-
ing.  This Article will show that learning and keeping up with changes
in foreign legal systems is unnecessary.1  What is needed is a grasp of
the fundamental legal principles of cross-border finance, in order to
ask the right questions of local counsel and understand the response
and its implications.2  It is, effectively, like learning a new language,3
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Director, Duke Global Capital Markets
Center.  I thank Laura Bartell, Carl Bjerre, Petrina Dawson, Jason Kravitt, Thomas Plank,
Richard Schmalbeck, Edwin Smith and Stephen Wallenstein for helpful comments on a draft of
this Article.
The Duke Global Capital Markets Center can be reached at wallenst@law.duke.edu, tel. (919)
613-7006.
1. I speak, of course, from the standpoint of a lawyer who does not regularly practice in
foreign jurisdictions, and clearly do not mean to suggest that foreign lawyers should not keep
up with their own jurisdictions’ laws.
2. It is important that local counsel understands the implications of the question in order
to think through any related legal principles.
3. Professor Carl Bjerre, one of the reviewers of this Article, indeed would carry my
“language” analogy further, suggesting that a financier’s concerns can be similar to those of a
tourist.  For example, a tourist might look in a phrase book to ask, “Where is the police sta-
tion?” whereas a financier would ask local counsel, “How may I enforce a judgment?” And
both would ask, “How may I convert my money?”  E-mail from Carl Bjerre, Associate Profes-
sor, University of Oregon School of Law, to Steven L. Schwarcz (Mar. 5, 1998) (on file with the
author).
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but one that has remarkable similarities to our own legal language if
one focuses on the fundamentals.4
This Article is intended to give the reader a grasp of the funda-
mental legal principles of cross-border finance from the perspective
of securitization.  Nonetheless, many of the concepts discussed are
more broadly applicable to any cross-border financing transaction,
such as secured or unsecured lending or project finance.
Securitization is a financing technique whereby a company trans-
fers rights in receivables or other financial assets to a special purpose
vehicle (SPV), which in turn issues securities to capital market inves-
tors and uses the proceeds of the issuance to pay for the financial as-
sets.5  The investors buy the securities based on their assessment of
the value of the financial assets, often without concern for the com-
pany’s financial condition.6  Thus, companies that otherwise cannot
obtain financing now can do so; and companies that can obtain fi-
nancing now may be able to do so at lower cost.7
Securitization has an increasingly international focus, in part be-
cause companies that wish to raise funds from the capital markets
may not be located in countries with established capital markets.8  In
4. In the following discussion, my perspective shifts back and forth among the company,
its special purpose vehicle, and investors in securities issued by the special purpose vehicle, be-
cause all these perspectives must be taken into account in structuring a securitization transac-
tion.
5. The concept of securitization is explained in a number of books and articles.  See gen-
erally TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET
POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991 & Supp. 1994); SECURITIZATION OF FI-
NANCIAL ASSETS (Jason H. P. Kravitt ed., 1991) [hereinafter KRAVITT]; STEVEN L.
SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION
(2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter STRUCTURED FINANCE]; Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization
and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TUL. L. REV. 101 (1997); Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A
Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061 (1996); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Al-
chemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994) [hereinafter Alchemy].  For
an historical perspective, see Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization:
Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369 (1991).
6. See generally Alchemy, supra note 5, at 141.
7. See id. at 141-42, 146 (showing that securitization can be less expensive than alterna-
tive funding sources and, even if not less expensive, can provide valuable “off-balance sheet”
funding).  A securitization transaction can be less expensive, for example, than a bank loan be-
cause banks raise a significant amount of their funds by issuing securities in the capital markets.
In order to lend these funds at a profit, banks must charge interest rates that reflect a mark-up
over their cost.  A company that uses securitization to obtain capital market funding without
going through a bank-intermediary avoids paying this mark-up.  Of course, whether the com-
pany will prefer that alternative depends on whether the cost-saving is greater than the transac-
tion costs of structuring the securitization.  See id. at 146.
8. The term “capital markets” means any market where debt and equity securities  are
traded.  Capital markets include private sources of debt and equity as well as organized mar-
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order to access capital market funding, those companies will have to
structure deals that cross their national borders.
I.  THRESHOLD ANALYSIS: JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS
AND THE SOURCE OF THE FINANCING
The first step in any potential cross-border financing is to deter-
mine its jurisdictional framework, including the jurisdictions of the
company seeking financing and of the source of that financing.  A
French company seeking a loan from a French bank located in Paris
is not engaged in a cross-border financing; it is a French financing and
French law applies.  But if a French company wants financing from a
U.S. bank, or from U.S. (or London or Singapore) capital markets, it
is a cross-border financing—requiring examination of the laws of the
jurisdictions whose borders have been crossed and the manner in
which those laws work (or, more often, fail to work) together.9
If capital markets are intended to be the source of financing, one
also must consider the local regulatory restrictions on the use of
those markets.  For example, U.S. capital markets are a significant
source of securitization financing because they have a broad investor
base and efficient pricing.10  However, the issuance of securities to in-
kets and exchanges.  See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE
AND INVESTMENT TERMS 59 (3d ed. 1991); THE PORTABLE MBA DESK REFERENCE: AN
ESSENTIAL BUSINESS COMPANION 86 (Paul A. Argenti ed., 1994) [hereinafter PORTABLE
MBA].  Securities under U.S. law is a broad term, not limited to stock or bonds.  See 15
U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(1) (West 1997); see also JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 117-207 (2d ed. 1997).  Historically, the world’s capital markets were
concentrated in major financial centers such as New York, London, Hong Kong and Tokyo,
and the securities traded were limited primarily to stocks and bonds.  In recent years, however,
business and legal innovation has spawned an array of securities that enable companies and
investors to shift risk more precisely between them, thereby more accurately and efficiently
pricing the rate of the return that the securities must yield in order to attract investors.  See
AMA MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 6-31 (John J. Hampton ed., 3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter AMA
HANDBOOK].  For a detailed discussion, see generally 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
MONEY & FINANCE 302 (Peter Newman et al. eds., 1992).
9. My theme of knowing how to ask the right questions of local counsel presumes, of
course, that there is a manageable number of jurisdictions in which local counsel will be
needed.  In some cases, many different jurisdictions have potential connections to the transac-
tion.  Resolving those conflicts of laws, to try to reduce the number of local counsel, is the sub-
ject of a considerable literature which is beyond the scope of this Article.  See, e.g., EUGENE F.
SCOLES & PETER HAY LIPSTEIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1992); JOHN G. KOLLIER, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1994); DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Lawrence Collins et al. eds.,
1993); FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE (1993);
LAWRENCE COLLINS, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1994).
10. Whether capital markets are efficient has been the subject of some debate.  This de-
bate revolves around the so-called “efficient market hypothesis.”  For a brief description, see
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vestors in these markets may require disclosure and regulation, par-
ticularly if the securities are issued without restrictions on trading
(so-called “public” offerings).11  In contrast, offshore or Euromarkets
may be more flexible,12 but may have a more limited investor base.
Issuers of securities sometimes can avoid regulation entirely by com-
bining markets—for example, using U.S. capital markets for a private
placement of subordinated debt to support a public offering of senior
debt securities conducted offshore.
II.  STRUCTURING THE TRANSACTION
Often a financing transaction—particularly a securitization—can
be structured as a loan or a sale.13  If structured as a loan, its form is
COX, supra note 8, at 31-43.  For an extended discussion, see generally ROBERT A. HAUGEN,
THE NEW FINANCE : THE CASE AGAINST EFFICIENT MARKETS (1995).
11. In the United States, a complex regulatory framework exists for issuing and dealing
with securities.  This framework is based on the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a et
seq. (West 1997 & Supp. 1998)), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a
et seq. (West 1997)).  For other countries see, for example, Giovanni Nardulli and Antonio
Segni, EU Cross-Border Securities Offerings: An Overview, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 887 (1996);
Samuel Wolff, Recent Developments in International Securities Regulations, 23 DENV. J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 347 (1995); Barry A.K. Rider, Global Trends in Securities Regulation: The Chang-
ing Legal Climate, 13 DICK. J. INT’L L. 513 (1995); Manning G. Warren III, The European Un-
ion’s Investment Services Directive, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 181 (1994); Joel P. Trachtman,
Unilateralism, Bilateralism, Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Functionalism: A Comparison
with Reference to Securities Regulation, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (1994).
12. The prefix “Euro” indicates a type of transaction which is conducted offshore and in-
volves lenders or borrowers from countries other than that of the currency of denomination.
The markets are primarily the Eurobond, Eurocredit and Eurodollar markets.  Eurobonds are
corporate bonds in U.S. dollars or other currencies, which are sold outside the country whose
currency is used.  See PALGRAVE DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 783.  They “have become an
important source of debt capital for both large and small companies throughout the world.
Normally, a Eurobond issue is syndicated by a consortium of international investment banks.
This provides wide exposure to investors in different countries.”  PORTABLE MBA, supra note
8, at 174.  Eurocredit is a loan offered simultaneously from several banks from more than one
country.  See PALGRAVE DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 783.  Eurodollars, a subset of Eurocur-
rency, means U.S. currency held in a deposit outside the United States, primarily Europe.
Sometimes securities, debt as well as equity, will be denominated in Eurodollars, which will
have the effect of principal, interest and dividends being paid out of U.S. dollars deposited out-
side the United States.  Whether this is attractive or not is influenced by exchange rates, but
U.S. companies tend to
raise capital in European [or other overseas] markets when U.S. market rates are un-
favorable.  This action can be an especially attractive avenue for companies making
an initial public offering that splits into two tranches—one to be traded on U.S. ex-
changes, and the other, a Eurotranche, to be traded on a European exchange.
PORTABLE MBA supra note 8, at 175.
13. For an article analyzing whether particular securitization transactions should be
viewed as loans or sales, see Peter Pantaleo et al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of
Financial Assets, 52 BUS. LAW. 159 (1996).
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relatively simple.  However, investors may prefer a sale structure.
This is particularly the case where local law would protect the com-
pany’s assets against creditor enforcement, as with the automatic stay
under U.S. bankruptcy law.14  When deciding how to structure the
transaction, the essential question is the extent to which the investors
providing the financing will be repaid in the event of the local law
equivalent of a bankruptcy case.15
A related question is how the company must account for the
transaction on its balance sheet.  If the transaction is a loan, the com-
pany would account for it as debt.  But if the transaction is accom-
plished through a sale, the company may be able to avoid booking a
debt (so called “off-balance sheet financing”).16  The ultimate ac-
counting treatment, however, would be subject to the accounting
principles that prevail in the company’s jurisdiction.17
III.  COMMERCIAL FINANCE ISSUES18
We next examine how the SPV and its investors stand as against
the company’s creditors, and whether any part of the transaction is
potentially preferential, fraudulent (whether intentionally or, under
14. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).  A secured creditor could not foreclose on its collateral
without court permission, which is rarely given.  European countries increasingly have been
adopting bankruptcy laws that include a stay of action by creditors against a bankrupt company
in order to facilitate the company’s rehabilitation.  See generally Eberhard Schollmeyer, The
New European Convention on International Insolvency, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 421 (1997).
15. In many jurisdictions, a secured lender’s remedies may be so strong that a sale struc-
ture provides only a marginal advantage.   On the other hand, in some jurisdictions the com-
mercial laws governing loans secured by financial assets may be so unsophisticated compared
to the laws governing the sale of financial assets that a sale is a more prudent structure.
16. See Alchemy, supra note 5, at 142.
17. Accounting principles vary widely between different systems; in the United States,
“Generally Accepted Accounting Principles” (GAAP) are used for reporting purposes.  For
other purposes, as in tax or corporate law, deviations from GAAP are used.  How substantial
the differences between jurisdictions can be is best illustrated by an example.  When Daimler-
Benz, the German automaker, wanted to have a listing on the New York Stock Exchange it did
not want to file financial information according to U.S. GAAP.  When it eventually did file, it
showed a loss of DM 949 million instead of a profit of DM 168 million it had shown under
German accounting rules.  See David Waller, Daimler-Benz Pierces Accounting Mystique, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at 24, available in WESTLAW, FTI database.  See also Richard Waters,
Survey of Accessing the U.S. Capital Markets (2): The World According to U.S. GAAP, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1996, at 34, available in WESTLAW, FTI database.  An additional article, by
Jason Kravitt, on international accounting standards for cross-border securitization transactions
was not completed in time for this symposium issue and is expected to be published in a subse-
quent issue of the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law.
18. For a more complete discussion of commercial finance issues arising in securitization,
see generally STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 5.
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local law, constructively), or in some other way problematic.  These
questions typically are addressed by laws that seek to allocate priority
to collateral or to ensure equality of distribution, or to preserve the
integrity, of a debtor’s estate.
A.  Perfection
The term “perfection” often is used to refer to protection of a
transferee’s interest in transferred assets from creditors of the trans-
feror.19 For assets that are physically located in a particular jurisdic-
tion, the law of that jurisdiction, or sometimes of the transferor’s ju-
risdiction, usually governs perfection.  In a securitization transaction,
perfection means protecting the SPV’s interest in the transferred fi-
nancial assets from claims of the company’s creditors.20 Because fi-
nancial assets are intangible, and therefore not physically located in
any particular jurisdiction, the law of the company’s jurisdiction in-
tuitively would be expected to, and usually does, govern perfection.21
Some jurisdictions have a filing or other public notice system for
perfection.22  Other legal systems may require notification of obligors,
which may be unacceptable and expensive.23  Often, the local perfec-
tion procedures may be unclear or impractical, in which case inves-
19. Or from the transferor’s bankruptcy representative.  In some jurisdictions, the concept
of perfection is not well recognized.  Once an asset is transferred, the transferor is simply
deemed no longer to have an interest in the asset.
20. See STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 5, at 37-40.
21. Under the UNCITRAL proposal, the location of assignor would govern.  See Spiro V.
Bazinas, An International Legal Regime for Receivables Financing: UNCITRAL’s Contribution,
8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 315, 320 (1998).  Accord U.C.C. § 9-103(3) (1995).  This is not,
however, a universal rule.  Some jurisdictions may look, for example, to the “law of the receiv-
able,” meaning the law of the contract under which the receivable arose or the law of the juris-
diction where the obligor is located.  Except to the extent large concentrations of obligors are
located in a given jurisdiction, it may be impractical to consult local counsel in each obligor’s
jurisdiction.
22. The purpose of filing is “to place third parties on notice of the transfer” of the asset.
See STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 5, at 37.  In the U.S. this is usually done by filing a
U.C.C.-1 financing statement.
Any argument that the filing of U.C.C.-1 financing statements indicates the parties in-
tention that the transaction constitutes a secured loan and not a sale can be obviated
by stating on the financing statement that the intention is to create a sale and that the
filing is being made because the U.C.C. requires it.
 Id.  UNCITRAL has proposed a registration system; on this issue see Bazinas, supra note 21.
23. Besides the obvious costs involved in having to notify all the obligors of, for example,
trade receivables, it sometimes may also be culturally unacceptable to do so because notifica-
tion might be seen as a signal that the company is in financial difficulties.  “This is a problem
practitioners often run into. . . .  But it is a problem that is not documented in the literature.”
Petrina R. Dawson, Rating Games with Contingent Transfer: A Structured Finance Illusion, 8
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 381, 399 n.102 (1998).
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tors are forced to rely on the company’s representations, warranties,
and covenants that the assets transferred to the SPV are, and will re-
main, unencumbered by third parties.
B.  Priority
Priority refers to the ranking of multiple claims against a trans-
ferred asset.  In a securitization context, it means that the SPV’s and
investors’ claims against the transferred financial assets are superior
to any third-party claims.24  Priority is normally accomplished, in a ju-
risdiction that perfects by filing, by being the first to file against the
assets.25  If the company seeking financing is located in a jurisdiction
that does not have a filing or other registration system to indicate
priority, the investors again may have to rely on the company’s repre-
sentations, warranties, and covenants.  This, of course, creates a much
greater risk of fraud than where a public filing system is used.
If the transaction involves financial assets that will be created at
a future date,26 one also must ask if the local law permits the transfer
of an asset not then in existence.27 Bankruptcy or insolvency laws28
also may restrict a company’s ability to transfer its future assets.29
24. Priority refers generally to the “relative ranking of claims to the same property . . . .  In
bankruptcy, [it] refers to secured claims that by statute receive more favorable treatment than
other, unsecured, claims.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1193-94 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter
BLACK’S].
25. Sometimes referred to as “first-in-time, first-in-right,” this generally gives priority to
the first person to file against the asset.  Priority is ascertained by searching the filing records to
determine whether other parties have prior filings against the relevant collateral or assets.  See,
e.g., U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1995).
26. For example, certain cross-border financings are supported by payments to be made in
the future under international telephone contracts.  An example for such a transaction is the
private placement by Teléfonos de México, S.A. (TelMex), the Mexican telephone company
(information about this transaction on file with the author).
27. The UNCITRAL proposal allows for this.  See Bazinas, supra note 21.  See also Steven
L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are Greater Than the Whole: How Securitization of Divisible Interests
Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and Open the Capital Markets to Middle-Market Compa-
nies, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 139, 149 n.36 (1993) (examining U.S. law on selling future
payments under a contract not yet in existence).  Many civil laws provide that a pledge or as-
signment can only be made when an asset exists.  This is based on the civil law view that a
pledge is a real right “as opposed to a personal right; it gives the creditor a right to seize and
sell assets and get a privilege on the proceeds of the sale.”  Michael H. Rubin & McGinchey
Stafford Lang, Recent Developments In Security Devices, With an Emphasis on Louisiana Law,
SB21 ALI-ABA 571, 588, available in WESTLAW, ALI-ABA database.
28. Such as 11 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Rights, Preventing
Windfalls: A Model for Harmonizing State and Federal Laws on Floating Liens, 75 N.C. L.
REV. 403, 434 (1997) (analyzing U.S. bankruptcy law restrictions on floating liens, and arguing
those restrictions should not apply to securitization transactions).
29. In a collateral context, a lien on future arising assets is often referred to as a “floating
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C.  Commingling
Another risk is that cash proceeds of assets pledged or sold to an
SPV may be mixed, or “commingled,” with the company’s own
funds.30  This risk to some extent reflects common sense: if the com-
pany is freely permitted to use collections, a court may find the com-
pany’s control inconsistent with the SPV’s claim that it has a per-
fected interest in the collections.  Local law may ameliorate this risk
somewhat.31  Commingling also can be prevented by using lockboxes,
or by segregating cash flows.  Control over cash flows—such as re-
quiring obligors to make payments into a trust account located in the
U.S.—also may mitigate the perfection risk.32  If these approaches are
not available, one should ascertain whether proceeds are traceable,
and ask local counsel whether traced proceeds are protected.33
D.  Preferential and Fraudulent Transfers
The bankruptcy, insolvency, or related laws of some jurisdictions
may permit or require a bankrupt company (or its representative34) to
avoid transfers of assets, or obligations incurred, by the company
prior to its bankruptcy.  Some of these laws—referred to as prefer-
ence laws because they avoid preferential transfers—are intended to
ensure equality of distribution of the company’s assets among all its
creditors.35  Less frequently, transfers made or obligations incurred by
a troubled company for less than equivalent value may be deemed to
be fraudulent36 and therefore voidable.
lien.”  See U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 2 (1995).
30. See STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 5, at 34, 40.
31. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (1995) (providing a formula that limits to some extent the
degree to which a perfected security interest will be lost by commingling).
32. In many civil law countries, however, bailment, custody, and other trust concepts are
not always recognized with respect to commingled cash, as civil law countries generally do not
recognize trust concepts.  See generally Donovan W. M. Waters, The Institution of the Trust in
Civil and Common Law, 252 RECUEIL DES COURS 113 (1995); Justin P. Thorens, The Common
Law Trust and the Civil Law Lawyer, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ON HIS 70TH BIRTHDAY 309-15 (David S.
Clark ed., 1990).
33. Another potential concern is that the method of perfection may refer to the original
collateral, but not the proceeds.  If the anticipated form of the proceeds is known (e.g., cash),
that concern can be alleviated by also describing the proceeds.
34. Under U.S. bankruptcy law, that representative is called the trustee in bankruptcy.
See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
35. In the United States, for example, 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994) limits preferential transfers
made within 90 days (or, if the transferee is an “insider,” made within one year) of the com-
pany’s bankruptcy.
36. Whether or not the transfer in fact is fraudulent.  The concept of “constructive fraud,”
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In a securitization context, preference and fraudulent transfer
laws are unlikely to apply because any transfers of financial assets
from the company to an SPV tend to be structured as sales for arm’s
length consideration.
IV.  CONTRACTUAL AND LEGAL RESTRICTIONS
The next issue is whether contractual or legal restrictions affect
the financing.  There are two ways that contractual restrictions can
arise.  First, there may be restrictions in the contract pursuant to
which collateral or financial assets are originated.  For example, a
lease or license contract may prohibit the lessor’s (or licensor’s) as-
signment of rights to payment received thereunder.  Under U.S. law,
certain restrictions on the assignment of financial assets, such as ac-
counts receivable, are unenforceable, but the laws of other jurisdic-
tions will differ.37
Contractual restrictions also can arise through covenants con-
tained in the company’s financing documents.38  Sometimes financ-
ings must be restructured to get around a restrictive covenant.39  This
takes creativity and an understanding of how the covenant is to be in-
terpreted.  For example, would a covenant restricting a secured loan
also restrict a sale?  The answer can be ambiguous if, under the gov-
erning law, the line between a sale and a secured loan is unclear.
Furthermore, the governing law is not always obvious.  For example,
the covenant may be contained in a financing document stated to be
governed by English law, but the covenant may prohibit liens on as-
sets of a company located in Mexico.  To determine whether English
law or Mexican law governs the interpretation of whether the fi-
nancing in question violates the covenant by creating a lien, counsel
in both jurisdictions must be consulted.  Sometimes even then the an-
swer may be unclear.
One also must consider whether local law itself restricts the fi-
nancing.
for example, is codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1994).
37. See U.C.C. § 9-318(4) (1995).  See also Bazinas, supra note 21.
38. These financing documents typically were put into place for other financings, not the
financing being structured.  For example, “negative pledge clauses” prohibit or limit the crea-
tion of secured debt.  See STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 5, at 28.  On the issue of negative
pledge clauses, see generally Thomas C. Mitchell, The Negative Pledge Clause and the Classifi-
cation of Financing Devices: A Question of Perspective (pts. 1 & 2), 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153,
263 (1986).
39. And sometimes the covenants are so restrictive that the financing simply cannot be
accomplished.
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V.  ENFORCEMENT ISSUES
In an international context, it is not enough to have theoretical
rights under the law.  The critical question is whether one can enforce
those rights,40 recognizing that the legal system granting the rights
may not be the same as the one in which enforcement occurs, and
that foreigners may not be viewed favorably when enforcing rights
against local citizens.  Investors will want the company being fi-
nanced to submit to their jurisdiction, or at least the jurisdiction of
the SPV.41  Of course, investors must determine whether those juris-
dictions would enforce such an arrangement.  Submission to jurisdic-
tion could entail, for example, appointing an agent of the company in
the investors’ (or SPV’s) jurisdiction to accept service of legal proc-
ess, usually referred to as a “process agent.”
If investors can obtain jurisdiction over the company in their
own (or the SPV’s) jurisdiction, it may not matter that the company
has no significant assets outside of its home jurisdiction.  Investors
would simply sue where the company has submitted to jurisdiction,
obtain a judgment, and take the judgment to the company’s home ju-
risdiction to be enforced.42  However, counsel in the home jurisdiction
should be consulted in advance to verify whether such a judgment
would be recognized and what, if any, defenses could be raised to its
enforcement.
Another potential problem is that the company itself could be
40. A scene from a Broadway play about a “realpolitik” elementary school class illustrates
this general point.  In the math lesson, the teacher asked how Joe, Jim and Bob would split six
bananas if Joe had two, Jim had four, and Bob joined them for lunch.  The answer was that Bob
was strongest and took all the bananas.
41. To be able to adjudicate a case, a court must have both subject matter and personal
jurisdiction.  See BLACK’S, supra note 24, at 854.  Subject matter jurisdiction means a court can
hear a particular kind of case.  See id. at 854, 1425.  Personal jurisdiction means the court has
legal power over the parties to enforce a judgment.  See id. at 854.  While several legal grounds
exist for personal jurisdiction, from the perspective of a potential plaintiff the “safest” way to
ensure such jurisdiction is to obtain consent of the party before a cause of action has arisen.
42. While arbitral awards are governed by the U.N. Convention for the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, no such treaty exists for the enforcement of foreign
judgments.  Countries often recognize foreign judgments on the basis of reciprocity.  In the
United States, this varies from state to state; however, several states have adopted the Uniform
Foreign Money Recognition Act and the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act.  See
generally Shirley Sostre-Oquendo, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the
United States and Canada in the Free Trade Era, 1992 DET. C.L. REV. 1019; see also Christo-
pher P. Hall & David B. Gordon, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the United States, 10
AUT INT’L L. PRACTICUM 57 (1997), available in WESTLAW, JLR database.  In other coun-
tries similar laws exist.  See, e.g., INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF KOREA
1152 (Sang Hyun Song ed., 1983).
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immune from suit under its local law, particularly if it has sovereign
or quasi-sovereign ownership.43  Requiring the company to waive
sovereign immunity may be a solution to this problem.  In the U.S.,
for example, such a waiver is enforceable under the U.S. Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, as amended.44  This, however, only
means that U.S. courts will respect the waiver of sovereign immunity.
One still must ask local counsel whether the waiver will be respected
in the company’s jurisdiction.
Other sovereign risks include currency exchange controls—the
risk that the company’s home jurisdiction may limit the export or pri-
vate use of U.S. dollars or other relevant foreign currency.45  This risk
might be mitigated by issuing securities denominated in local cur-
rency (rather than U.S. dollars).46  Risk mitigation can also be at-
tained if the company has significant assets outside its home jurisdic-
tion or offshore obligors on financial assets,47 or by arranging local
currency swaps for U.S. dollars (discussed below).  One should also
inquire whether the company’s home jurisdiction has ever imposed,
43. Sovereign immunity is traditionally a concept of public international law.  Under this
concept the sovereign, historically the monarch, today the state and its officials, cannot be sued
unless they consent.  While it was considered to be absolute in the beginning, over time certain
recognized exemptions have developed.  See MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 491-
522 (4th ed. 1997).  The most important exemption under the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Act is the “commercial activity exemption.”  See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1994).  A similar exam-
ple can be found in the United Kingdom in § 3(3) of its State Immunity Act of 1978.  See
SHAW, supra, at 505.
44. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq. (1994).
45. Currency control has occurred before in several places, for example Brazil, Nigeria,
China, Romania, South Africa, Venezuela and, at least de facto, in Mexico.  See, e.g., Scott
McMurray, Soybean Futures Prices are Expected to Plunge on Reforms Unveiled by the Presi-
dent of Brazil, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1990, at C12, available in WESTLAW, WSJ database;
Thomas Petzinger Jr. & Peter Truell, U.K. Audit Points to Larger BCCI Role by Two Top U.S.
Cable-TV Executives, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1992, at A4, available in WESTLAW, WSJ data-
base; Trade Conference in Beijing Attracts U.S. Businessmen, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1988, avail-
able in WESTLAW, WSJ database; Romania Revives Currency Curb, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27,
1992, at A8, available in WESTLAW, WSJ database; Ken Wells, U.S. Investment in South Af-
rica Quickens, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1994, at A15, available in WESTLAW, WSJ database; Ob-
server: Caracas Chestnut, FIN. TIMES, July 25, 1994, at 15, available in WESTLAW, FTI data-
base; David Asman, The Americas: Complex Models Won’t Stop Mexico’s Peso From
Tumbling, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1995, at A11, available in WESTLAW, WSJ database.  For a
description of the international obligations that impact a country’s ability to impose exchange
controls, see generally Central and East European Law Initiative, Currency Exchange Controls:
A Concept Paper Prepared for the Government of Bulgaria, 29 INT’L LAW. 257 (1995).
46. However, exchange controls could limit the export of the local currency.  Furthermore,
investors may not want to invest in securities denominated in a local currency.
47. That way, enforcement against those assets or obligors will not, de facto, be subject to
the local laws of the company’s country.
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or is likely to impose, debt moratoria of the type that would restrict
the company from paying its debts to foreigners.48  Finally, inquiry
should be made as to whether the SPV must be licensed in that juris-
diction to enforce its rights against the company.
VI.  CURRENCY EXCHANGE, SWAPS AND HEDGING
Currency exchange issues loom large in cross-border finance.
The problem is that the currency in which investors invest may be dif-
ferent than the currency received to repay them.  For example, if in-
vestors buy U.S. dollar-denominated securities to enable an SPV to
purchase a portfolio of Japanese yen-denominated receivables, the
investors would be taking the added risk that, when the receivables
pay, the dollar-to-yen exchange rate would yield insufficient dollars
to repay them.49  Investors generally prefer the exchange rate risk to
be “hedged”50 through “swaps” and other derivative products.
A “derivative” product means a contract that creates future
rights and obligations regarding an asset that underlies a larger trans-
action.51  Derivative products can be broken down into forward con-
tracts and options.  In an option, one party pays for the right (but not
the obligation) to buy an asset at a future date for a negotiated
48. Debt moratoria have happened before, for example in the Philippines, South Africa
and Russia.  See Julia Leung, Filipinos Plan Again to Issue Overseas Bonds, WALL ST. J., Oct.
30, 1992, at B4B, available in WESTLAW, WSJ database; Neil Behrmann, South Africa Hopes
to Reschedule Debt as Total Declines, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1993, available in WESTLAW,
WSJ database; Terence Roth & Tim Carrington, Moscow Stops Paying Bank Debt Principal,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1991, at A3, available in WESTLAW, WSJ database.  Most recently, In-
donesia was considering such a moratorium, but eventually opted against it.  See Darren
McDermott, Jakarta’s Debt Plan Opens to Mixed Reviews, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1998, available
in WESTLAW, WSJ database.  Certain countries may have political risks.  Political risk insur-
ance sometimes may be available to cover specific risks, although it is very expensive.  See
Claire A. Hill, How Investors React to Political Risk, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 283 (1998).
49. Of course, investors could convert the yen to dollars on the spot market.  “A spot
transaction involves the immediate purchase of, payment for, and delivery of a fixed amount of
a currency.  Such transactions are said to occur on the spot market.”  AMA HANDBOOK, supra
note 8, at 6-43.  But fluctuating exchange rates put investors at risk that a weakened yen would
yield insufficient dollars.
50. “Hedging, using the futures market, is the process of neutralizing or significantly re-
ducing financial risks . . . .  There are two fundamental reasons for hedging.  The first is to re-
duce risk . . . .  The second is the ability to separate the timing decision from market opportuni-
ties.”  See id. at 6-32.
51. See, e.g., Joseph L. Motes III, Note, A Primer on the Trade and Regulation of Deriva-
tive Instruments, 49 SMU L. REV. 579, 583-84 (1996).  A great deal of derivative documenta-
tion is standardized worldwide through use of so-called “ISDA forms” developed by the Inter-
national Swaps and Derivatives Association.
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price.52  A forward contract is a contractual obligation to buy (or,
from the seller’s standpoint, to sell) an asset, such as foreign cur-
rency, at a specified price at a future settlement date.  A swap is an
array of forward contracts—a forward contract covering each date
that settlement is to be made.53
Currency hedging is accomplished by entering into a swap with a
third party (called a swap counterparty54) to exchange the relevant
currencies at the future settlement dates.  The parties contractually
agree in advance to the exchange rate that will be deemed to apply
on those settlement dates to ensure that the currency conversion will
yield sufficient dollars to repay investors.55
Investors, of course, will want to be comfortable that the coun-
terparty will be able to perform its swap obligations on each settle-
ment date if the net value of the swap at that date runs against the
counterparty.56  If, therefore, there is a realistic risk that the counter-
party may be unable to perform, the investors may attempt to mini-
mize performance risk by requiring the counterparty to collateralize
its future obligations or obtain a third-party guaranty, not unlike a
lender requiring assurance of future performance from a borrower.
The performance risk also can be minimized by requiring the coun-
terparty to make daily or other periodic adjustment payments of the
52. See AMA HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 6-32; Motes, supra note 51, at 589.
53. See Motes, supra note 51, at 590.  The actual underlying swapped assets are rarely ex-
changed.  Rather, one party to the swap makes a payment to the other based on the net valua-
tion of the swapped assets on the future settlement date.  See JOHN F. MARSHALL & KENNETH
R. KAPNER, THE SWAPS MARKET 32 (2d ed. 1993) (“The underlying assets may or may not be
exchanged and are referred to as notionals.”).  The asset could be foreign currencies in the case
of currency swaps in cross-border finance transactions, or might be oil in the case of a swap in-
volving a company that needs oil at a future date and wants to fix the price.  Swaps are there-
fore akin to gambles on future asset values.  Indeed, there is ongoing controversy as to whether
derivative products can be abused, particularly where investors borrow on leverage to purchase
derivative products for speculation.  In a non-leveraged context, however, the use of deriva-
tives to hedge currency (or interest rate) risks in cross-border transactions is not only prudent
but essential for minimizing the risk to investors.
54. Counterparties are often financial institutions, or their affiliates, that deal in derivative
products (swap dealers).
55. Thus, if the investors expect to receive payment in Japanese yen and, based on the an-
ticipated amount of yen, need an exchange rate of 126.29 yen per U.S. dollar to be fully repaid
in dollars, a swap counterparty would be sought who is willing to exchange dollars for yen at
that rate on the future settlement dates.  If on a settlement date the exchange rate has changed
to 130 yen per dollar, the investors would be protected because the swap counterparty has
taken the currency exchange risk.  But the swap party would profit on the exchange if the ex-
change rate has become 125 yen per dollar.
56. That is, if the exchange rate has changed to make the value of the currency that the
counterparty has agreed to sell higher than the price it agreed to accept for the sale.
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changing net value of the swap, thereby reducing the risk that the
counterparty will be unable to pay the net amount due at a future
date.  This is referred to as “marking to market.”57
The terms of the swap agreement also may be relevant.  For ex-
ample, any conditions precedent to effectiveness may need to be sat-
isfied at the closing when the investors provide financing.  Also, the
SPV may be subject to taxes if it gains the advantage of the swap.58
VII.  TAX59
There are three main tax issues in any securitization financing:
whether a transfer of assets from the company to the SPV constitutes
a sale or a loan; whether the SPV used to effectuate the financing is
itself subject to tax; and how investors in the SPV’s securities are
taxed on their investment.60
A.  Does the Transfer of Assets from the Company to the SPV
Constitute a Sale or a Loan?
This question is governed, of course, by the tax law of the com-
pany’s jurisdiction, and can depend on whether benefits and burdens
of ownership of the assets have been transferred.61  If the transfer of
assets from the company to the SPV is a sale for tax purposes, the
company may have to recognize tax loss or gain in its own jurisdic-
tion.  Alternatively, if the transfer is a loan for tax purposes, normally
it is tax neutral from the company’s standpoint; but then there may
be withholding taxes on interest paid on the loan.62
57. For a description of the mark to market methodology, see THE HANDBOOK OF
CURRENCY AND INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT 25-29 (Robert J. Schwartz & Clifford
W. Smith Jr. eds., 1990).  Forward contracts that include periodic marking to market are called
“futures contracts.”  For the relation between mark to market and futures, see MARSHALL &
KAPNER, supra note 53, at 19.
58. Investors may try to require payments to be made net of taxes.  See discussion in Part
VII, infra.
59. The author thanks Willys H. Schneider for helpful comments on this section.  For
additional discussion of tax issues, see generally Willys H. Schneider, Selected United States Tax
Issues in Cross-Border Securitizations, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 453 (1998).
60. See generally STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 5, at 45.
61. Characterization of a given transfer as a sale or a loan also will depend on the legal
context.  Transactions can be characterized differently for tax, bankruptcy, or accounting pur-
poses.
62. To determine whether a transfer will be characterized as a sale or a loan, several fac-
tors will be considered.  For a list of such factors, see STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 5, at
46.
SCHWARCZ9MACRO1.DOC 12/16/98  12:22 PM
1998] THE UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE OF CROSS-BORDER FINANCE 249
A cross-border withholding tax is a jurisdiction’s attempt to tax a
non-resident’s interest income to the extent such interest is paid by a
resident.  For example, the jurisdiction of the company may attempt
to tax interest income of the SPV if the transfer of assets from the
company to the SPV is characterized for tax purposes as a loan from
the SPV to the company.  Because the non-resident SPV may not be
directly subject to taxes in the company’s jurisdiction, that
jurisdiction may require the company to withhold a portion of the
amount of interest otherwise payable and pay the withheld amount to
the relevant taxing authority.63
Bi-lateral tax treaties (between the company’s and the SPV’s ju-
risdictions), where they exist, can reduce or eliminate withholding
taxes.  For example, tax treaties exist between the United States and
most major European countries, and also among European Union
countries.
A company could indemnify the SPV for any withholding taxes
and agree to pay additional (gross-up) amounts necessary to assure
the net amount received by the SPV.  A lender SPV typically would
negotiate to make the foreign borrower (the company) directly obli-
gated for indemnity and gross-up payments.  In a securitization, how-
ever, the company cannot always make such an indemnity and still
achieve a “true sale.”64  Sometimes the risk of a withholding tax is
covered by over-collateralization;65 but that may be insufficient if the
withholding tax liability cannot be quantified and therefore matched
by assets.66
B.  Is the SPV Itself Subject to Tax?
Another significant tax concern is whether an SPV is subject to a
separate tax on its income—the so-called “entity-level” tax.  Such a
63. Even if the SPV gets a tax credit in its own jurisdiction to avoid double taxation, the
tax laws of different jurisdictions do not always perfectly match and the tax on the SPV may
“kill” the transaction.  It would therefore lead effectively to double taxation similar to that of
an entity level tax.  See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
64. “True sale” is one of the key elements of asset securitization.  It means that the trans-
fer effectively transfers the ownership of the underlying asset to the SPV.  The main focus is on
whether this transfer effectively removes the assets from the originator under bankruptcy law.
For a detailed description of the concept, see STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 5, at 28.
65. Over-collateralization refers to intentionally maintaining a large discount on the out-
standing balance of the receivables to be purchased.  This is done to account for anticipated
defaults and delays in collection.  See id. at 6.
66. Withholding taxes usually apply only to interest on loans.  If the transfer is a sale, a
withholding tax may still be payable on interest bearing receivables purchased if the applicable
jurisdiction treats discount on a sale as the equivalent of interest for withholding tax purposes.
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tax can greatly reduce cash flow available to pay the SPV’s investors
(unless the tax is offset by a deduction for interest paid by the SPV
on its debt securities).  Resolution of this matter is governed by the
tax law of the SPV’s jurisdiction and may also be affected by the ju-
risdiction in which the SPV is deemed to be engaged in business.
If, for example, the SPV is formed in the U.S. (to issue securities
to investors in the U.S. capital markets), normal U.S. tax rules would
govern taxation of the SPV.  Therefore if the SPV is a grantor trust or
(for tax purposes) a partnership, there would be no entity level tax;
but if the SPV were a corporation, there could be an entity level tax.67
It should be noted that recent “check-the-box” rules in the U.S. per-
mit most entities that do not publicly issue equity securities to choose
non-entity level taxation.  Also, entities that qualify as a financial as-
set investment securitization trust (FASIT),68 which is similar in cer-
tain ways to a REMIC,69 are not subject to an entity level tax.70  On
the other hand, if the SPV is formed outside the U.S., foreign tax
rules would govern its taxation.71
If a U.S. entity is deemed to be “doing business” directly or
through agents in a foreign jurisdiction, or if a foreign entity is
deemed to be “doing business” in another foreign jurisdiction or in
the U.S., the tax rules of that other jurisdiction may also apply.  For
example, if a foreign company acting as servicer of collateral or fi-
nancial assets has authority to modify the terms of receivables pur-
chased by a U.S. SPV, the SPV may be found to be “doing business”
67. Under U.S. tax law, corporations are seen as entities different from their shareholders.
Their income is therefore subject to a corporate income tax, with an additional income tax for
the shareholders for dividends paid.  This is not true for a so-called S-corporation, which is not
subject to this separate corporate income tax.  On this point, see BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S.
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 1.05 (6th
ed. 1994).
68. For a brief description of FASIT, see William A. Wurch, The FASITnating Facets of
FASITs, PROPERTY & PROBATE, Nov./Dec. 1997, at 21.
69. Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs) are “organizations formed to
hold a fixed pool of real estate mortgage” which issue multiple classes of interests therein.  See
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 67, at ¶ 1.06(3).
70. REMICs are not treated as entities and are therefore not subject to the separate in-
come tax under 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 860A to 860G (West 1986 & Supp. 1998).  See BITTKER &
EUSTICE, supra note 67, at ¶ 1.06(3).  For a description of the tax aspects of FASITs, see Har-
oldene F. Wunder, Tax Facets of FASITs, 15 J. TAX’N INVESTMENTS 22 (1997).
71. In each case, if shareholders of the SPV are in jurisdictions different than the SPV’s
jurisdiction, it will be necessary to determine whether the SPV is subject to an “anti-avoidance”
tax on income imputed to such shareholders under their jurisdictions.  For a discussion of the
use of anti-avoidance provisions, see generally Andrew H. Kingissepp, Canadian Tax Court
Holds General Anti-Avoidance Rule Applies to Deny Tax Treaty Benefits to U.S. Resident, 8 J.
INT’L TAX’N 413 (1997).
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through the company (as its agent) in the foreign jurisdiction, sub-
jecting the SPV to foreign tax.  It is therefore important to consult lo-
cal counsel in order to structure the transaction to avoid a finding of
“doing business,” such as by limiting the scope of the company’s
servicing authority.
If an income tax treaty applies, an entity should not be subject to
tax in another jurisdiction (apart from possible withholding tax) if it
has no “permanent establishment” (generally no office or other place
of business and no agents with authority to bind it) in the foreign ju-
risdiction.72
C.  How Are the Investors Taxed on Their Investment?
This is normally governed by the tax law of each investor’s juris-
diction, although the tax characterization of securities issued to inves-
tors in the SPV’s jurisdiction (if different) may be relevant.  Investors
may also be subject to withholding taxes on cross-border interest
payments.
D.  Other Tax Issues
Swaps and hedges may be subject to taxation.  For example, gain
or loss may have to be recognized based on fluctuations in the rela-
tive value of U.S. dollars and the currency of the assets.  There also
may be tax issues where transfers are among related entities, such as
multiple SPVs in different jurisdictions.  The bottom line is therefore
to coordinate with each jurisdiction’s tax counsel, and try to obtain
appropriate tax indemnities and gross-up provisions.
VIII.  RATING AGENCY CONSIDERATIONS
It is increasingly common in cross-border financial transactions,
and especially in securitizations, for investors to rely to a large extent
on rating agencies for comfort as to the structure of the transaction
and for informational diligence on the underlying collateral or other
assets.73  Rating agencies are private companies74 whose business is
72. Stamp taxes, transfer taxes and value-added taxes on the purchase price of assets or on
servicing fees also may be charged, and local counsel should be consulted regarding those
taxes.
73. For a discussion of rating agencies, see Alchemy, supra note 5, at 136-44.  See also
Dawson, supra note 23.  Investors, of course, should independently investigate the risk of their
investments and not rely solely on ratings.  See infra note 76.
74. Rating agencies are neither governmental agencies nor are they presently regulated in
the United States.  The only minimal form of governmental control is in the context of desig-
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assessing the risks associated with the full and timely payment of debt
securities.75  The significance of the rating depends entirely on the
reputation among investors of the particular rating agency.  For rat-
ing debt securities issued in securitization transactions, the most re-
spected and trusted agencies are Standard & Poor’s Ratings Group,
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., Fitch Investors Service, Inc., and
Duff & Phelps, Inc., all founded in the U.S. but now having offices
and providing ratings to investors worldwide.76
Long- and short-term debt have separate rating scales, generally
reflecting the different risks associated with long- and short-term in-
vesting.  The highest rating on long-term debt securities is typically
AAA, with ratings descending to AA, then to A, and then to BBB
and below.77  The highest rating on short-term debt securities—such
as commercial paper78—is typically A-1,79 with ratings descending to
A-2, A-3 and below.  The higher the rating, the lower the rating
nating a rating agency a “nationally recognized statistical rating organization” (NRSRO).  For
a description of the informal process of designation, see Amy K. Rhodes, The Role of the SEC
in the Regulation of the Rating Agencies: Well-Placed Reliance or Free-Market Interference?, 20
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 293, 323 (1996).  If a rating agency is designated as an NRSRO, its rat-
ings can be relied upon by government agencies like the SEC in certain federal regulatory
schemes.  For example, Rule 3a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1
to 80a-64 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998), exempts certain structured financings from registering and
complying with that Act if, among other requirements, the securities are rated at least
“investment grade” by at least one NRSRO.  While there has been some debate whether more
regulation is necessary, and the SEC itself has issued a request for comments on the use of the
NRSRO designation in the context of Rule 3a-7, see Concept Release on Nationally Recog-
nized Statistical Rating Organizations, SEC Release Nos. 33-7085; 34-34616, 59 Fed. Reg.
46,314 (Sept. 7, 1994), many believe that market forces create enough checks on rating agen-
cies.  See generally Rhodes, supra; Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Comment, An Examination of the
Current Status of Rating Agencies and Proposals for Limited Oversight of Such Agencies, 30
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 579 (1993).
75. What is rated is both the likelihood of payment and the timeliness of payment on the
securities.  See Salomon B. Samson & Gail I. Hessol, Ultimate Recovery in Ratings: A Concep-
tual Framework, S&P CREDITWEEK, Nov. 6, 1996, at 25.  Equity securities are not rated be-
cause they have neither a specified maturity date nor a contractually-fixed principal amount.
76. Rating agencies make their rating determinations based solely on information pro-
vided by the issuer of securities.  Hence, a rating agency, whatever its reputation, cannot pro-
vide a rating that is more reliable than that information.  Ratings do not, for example, cover the
risk of fraud.
77. Long-term ratings also sometimes have “+” and “-” designations associated with the
ratings.  See KRAVITT, supra note 5, at 7-63.
78. Commercial paper means short-term debt securities issued by a corporation.
“Typically, only large, quality rated firms issue commercial paper.  Issuers like commercial pa-
per because of its maturity, its flexibility and the absence of hard collateral.”  PORTABLE MBA,
supra note 8, at 99.
79. A-1 is the highest short-term rating for Standard & Poor’s, P-1 for Moody’s, F-1 for
Fitch, and D-1 for Duff & Phelps.  See KRAVITT, supra note 5, at 7-65.
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agency has assessed the risk associated with the securities in ques-
tion.80  Ratings below BBB- are deemed non-investment grade,81 and
indicate that full and timely repayment on the securities may be
speculative.
Because a high rating signals low risk to investors, an SPV that
issues AAA rated securities can more easily attract investors in its
securities than can an SPV that issues AA or BBB rated securities.
Therefore the SPV with AAA rated securities can charge a lower in-
terest rate on those securities, and still attract investors, than can the
SPV with the lower rated securities.82  The lower interest rate lowers
the SPV’s financing cost, which in turn lowers the financing cost of
the company for which the SPV was created.83
The existence and almost universal acceptance of ratings make it
much easier for investors in the capital markets to assess the safety of
a given issuance of securities.84  In a securitization context, this facili-
tates the ability of an SPV to issue securities, and of investors in those
securities to resell them to other investors.  However, the almost uni-
versal demand by investors for ratings makes rating agencies to a
large extent gatekeepers of the types of securities that investors will
buy.  That can slow down experimentation with potentially innova-
80. A rating usually is assigned to a particular issuance of a company’s securities, and not
necessarily to the company itself, because a company could issue different securities having
different risk characteristics.  Hence, a company’s senior debt securities almost always would
be rated higher than the same company’s subordinated debt securities.  Recently, however,
some rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor’s, have been assigning company ratings that ap-
ply to any issuance of the company’s senior unsecured debt securities.
81. The term investment grade “was originally used by various regulatory bodies to con-
note obligations eligible for investment by institutions such as banks, insurance companies and
savings and loan associations.  Over time, this term gained widespread acceptance throughout
the investment community.”  STANDARD & POOR’S, CORPORATE RATINGS CRITERIA 9 (1998)
[hereinafter RATINGS CRITERIA].
82. An investor therefore sometimes may prefer, if it finds the extra risk acceptable, to
invest in a BBB rated security rather than a AAA rated security in order to benefit from the
higher interest rate.  The rating addresses only the safety, and not the economic desirability to
the investor, of the investment.
83. Accordingly, companies always want their SPV’s securities to have the highest rating
possible, given the risks associated with the applicable securitization transaction.  This some-
times creates a conflict for companies or SPVs located in countries that have political or finan-
cial instabilities, because the rating on the securities usually is limited by the rating of the coun-
try itself.  This is sometimes referred to as sovereign ceiling.  See RATINGS CRITERIA, supra
note 81, at 51.
84. Indeed, rating agencies view their ratings as worldwide standards, and not as relative
risk standards within countries.  Thus, a BBB rating on securities is intended to convey the
same level of risk irrespective of the jurisdiction in which the securities are issued.  Interview
with Petrina Dawson, Managing Director and Associate General Counsel, Standard & Poor’s
Ratings Group (Mar. 11, 1998).
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tive securitization structures.85
IX.  CONCLUSION
This Article has highlighted and explained the fundamental
principles of cross-border finance and has shown that they allow for
universal communication in any legal system.  In the context of an ac-
tual transaction, my central point is simple: retain local counsel with
top expertise, know how to ask the relevant questions, and be sure
counsel fully understands both the questions and their underlying ra-
tionale.
85.  Although an extended discussion of rating agencies is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, rating agencies tend to focus on the following issues: how much weight to give to over-
collateralization?; does it matter if a true sale (usually not, so long as if the company fails, col-
lections of the receivables can be used without delay to pay the investors); comfort level with
underlying receivables, including large obligor concentrations; comfort level with the company
originating the receivables; currency risks (currency swap counterparty risk); comfort level
with, and track record of, the “sponsor” of the SPV; commingling/cash controls; sovereign risk
issues; legal opinions (local counsel are often asked to address the following issues in their legal
opinions: legal, valid, binding; true sale/remedies in bankruptcy or insolvency; non-
consolidation of company and SPV; choice of law respected; perfection/priority; obligations at
least pari passu; no violation of law or contract; no sovereign immunity; no preference, etc.;
duties and taxes; issues regarding nature of the receivables; e.g., future payment streams).
